GRASSROOTS CEASEFIRE MONITORING:

    jan-march2003GRASSROOTS CEASEFIRE MONITORING:

    An Investigative Mission in the provinces of Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur and Lano del Norte

    (Initiatives for International Dialogue and Mindanao Peoples Caucus)

    FINAL ASSESSMENT

    The investigative mission notes that the ceasefire with the (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) MILF is in a fragile state. In the last quarter of the year 2002 and the early part of January 2003, the investigation found that the agreement was violated with disquieting abandon. Fault cannot be laid categorically against either side, but both parties have done less than they could have, or probably should have, to ensure the success of the agreement. While both parties insist that they have adhered unwaveringly to the ceasefire agreement, in reality each side has interpreted ambiguous areas of the ceasefire agreement to their advantage.

    ANALYSIS

    1) Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Operations against Terrorists and Criminals

    The investigators noted that in the vast majority of cases, military assaults were launched in pursuit of criminals (kidnappers, cattle-rustlers) or terrorists (members of the Abu Sayyaf or the Pentagon gang). Attempts were made by the investigators to verify these claims, but no conclusion can be drawn at this point in time. What can be said though is that military operations said to have been launched against terrorists or criminals, have engaged in battle recognized MILF forces that were found by investigators to have no evident connection with either a terrorist group or a criminal syndicate.

    The investigation notes that there has been an attempt to curb the apparent misuse of the ceasefire provision (Article III, No. 9.3) which permitted the “hot pursuit of suspects by police and military personnel.” The May 6 Joint Communiqué brokered for the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) by Sec. Noberto Gonzales (and not the Panel) agreed that:

    The AFP / PNP shall convey an order of battle containing the names and identities of criminal elements… in MILF areas / communities. (Article 3)

    The MILF and the GRP shall form an ad hoc joint action group against criminal elements. This group will operate in tandem with their respective co-ordinating committees on the cessation of hostilities. (Article 4)

    However, neither of these articles has been implemented. Members of the AFP stated very frankly that such an order of battle was the responsibility of the PNP, and that it was only in a position of supporting their law enforcement efforts. However, the investigation notes again, that nearly all AFP operations conducted were launched in pursuit of criminals or as anti-terrorist operations. Indeed, the investigators know of no operation that has been conducted by the PNP in pursuit of criminals in MILF areas. For this reason, we recommend that the Department of National Defence in co-ordination with the Philippine National Police produce and submit to the MILF the order of battle against criminal elements in MILF areas.

    2)Lack of co-ordination between the Co-ordinating Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCHs) and the armed forces

    The investigation notes that: on a number of occasions, prior consultation with the Co-ordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) by the MILF could have prevented an encounter. The October 2002 encounter in Lanao and the January 2003 encounter in Sultan Kudarat occurred in part, as a result of the movement of MILF forces that was not reported to the joint-CCCH.

    The failure of the MILF to report the troop movement, and provide an adequate explanation to the joint-CCCH, gave cause to the military to consider this a “massive deployment and / or movement of MILF forces” that is listed in the August 2001 agreement as a prohibited provocative act.

    The investigation also notes that in every situation there was a possibility for the AFP to co-ordinate with its own CCCH, with members of the Local Monitoring Team (LMT), and with the MILF prior to conducting a military operation. However, in no investigated incident, did this happen.

    3) Distinguishing Terrorists from Legitimate Rebels

    In a number of the reported cases more accurate delineation between true MILF forces and other armed groups such as the Abu Sayyaf and the Pentagon gang could have prevented the conflict. In this respect two things need to be done.

    First, the legality of MILF fighters and commanders needs to be clarified by the PNP or AFP. This should be done in consultation with the respective CCCH and the Panel. For instance, in Lanao, the military claimed to be in pursuit of a Commander that the MILF regard as organic members of the MILF. Their legality can only be solved through co-ordination between the PNP / AFP and the two panels.

    Second, the MILF needs to delineate their positions / communities / camps. The Implementing Guidelines on Security (Article 2, No. 4) reads:

    Henceforth, should there be delineation of lines / positions agreed upon by both the Parties, any action that projects forces or fire beyond one party's identified line / position shall be considered offensive military operations, which is prohibited under this agreement.

    However, there has been no apparent attempt so far to begin delineating MILF ‘lines / positions’, or indeed MILF camps. The MILF argue that the camps and positions recognized in former agreements apply today. In the current agreement there is a reference to a past agreement, but it does not explicitly refer to the recognition of camps. However, the GRP has publicly said that those camps captured during the 2000 war, would not be returned, and that this item was non-negotiable

    While the ceasefire agreement is not explicit regarding this question of camps, both sides, it appears, will continue to make their own contradictory interpretations. Unless resolved this is likely to be a continuing source of conflict.

    4) No Effort to Demilitarize

    Both MILF and GRP are currently recruiting and expanding their respective forces. The MILF has also acknowledged it is recruiting and training combatants. And in Maguindanao, for instance, the 37th Infantry Battalion also admitted that it was recruiting men to build a larger paramilitary force.

    Although the enlargement of forces is not discussed under the ceasefire agreement, the current strategy of both the MILF and the GRP is certainly aggravating the situation. Nor, the investigators note, is this strategy conducive either to stable negotiations or to build confidence between the two parties.

    5) Absence of any form of sanction

    The Manual of Instruction (Article 3, No. 1, para (i.)) states that:

    The GRP-MILF shall inform the GRP-MILF Peace Panels of any GRP-MILF forces or field commanders committing violations of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the agreement of Peace of 2001. It shall be the responsibility of the GRP-MILF Peace Panels to take immediate and necessary action to stop any violation and punish respective forces or military field commanders who violate the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the agreement of Peace of 2001.

    In the incidents investigated, neither panel took any such action. The probable reason is that there has been no investigation carried out by the established monitoring mechanism, the local monitoring team, in any province except Lanao.

    6) Lack of knowledge about the ceasefire

    The investigators found that there was little knowledge about the ceasefire among the local government units, the affected communities or the ground-level combatants.

    7) Impact on Civilians

    The investigation notes that the encounters between MILF and AFP/CAFGU directly led to numerous human rights violations. The most serious, verified, human rights violations include:

    -           Civilians killed during a military operation

    -           Civilians displayed evidence of being physically abused

    As a result of the encounter many civilians were forced to evacuate their homes, and leave for evacuee camps. A number of those that returned found that their:

    -           houses were destroyed or burnt

    -           livestock was stolen or killed

    -           household items were stolen, or destroyed

    -           food was burnt or stolen

    Many civilians have not been able to return to their homes, because either they are prevented by the military, or their homes have been destroyed. There has been inadequate assistance given to evacuees in all areas that were investigated. Often a large quantity of food aid was found to go missing.

    The investigation notes that the proper implementation of the June 2001 agreement on the rehabilitation aspect (Article B.3) is immediately required.

    The Parties shall safely return evacuees to their places of origin: provide all the necessary financial / material and technical assistance to start a new life, as well as allow them to be awarded reparations for their properties lost or destroyed by reason of the conflict.


     

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